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Since the events of September 11, 2001 there has 
been heightened awareness of the potential for a 
terrorist attack of a biological or chemical nature on 
the U.S. food supply, including agriculture. Along-
side the obvious terrorist objective to cause harm 
to humans, animals, and property, a secondary, and 
in some cases overriding, objective of terrorism is 
to cause economic harm. Economic harm can arise 
from disruption to one of the many links across the 
supply chain, but the most potent form of economic 
harm might very well be the psychological impact 
of fear, and how it affects consumption. How the 
public views terrorist threats is not well understood, 
yet such views are perhaps more important than 
the dearth of literature in this area might suggest. 
From the business point of view agribusiness firms 
and retailers, should know what their customers are 
thinking. Furthermore, any risk communication re-
quires knowing what constitutes a perceived risk 
or perceived vulnerability should indeed an event 
happen. This paper provides results from a 2004 
nationwide poll in the United States to seek a better 
understanding of what consumers believe and how 
they view the vulnerabilities of specific food types 
and points on the supply chain to a terrorist disrup-
tion of the U.S. food supply. Our study is the first 
to examine this issue. Its importance lies in better 
understanding “what” consumers think about ter-
rorist risks across the food-supply chain and food 
groups, and also provides a glimpse of “who” holds 
particular beliefs. We find, for example, that per-
ceived vulnerabilities are not uniformly distributed 
across consumers and that many factors in combina-
tion can lead consumers to rank one food type as 
being more vulnerable than another or one point in 
the food-distribution/processing channel as more 
vulnerable than another. By understanding that dif-
ferences in perceptions exist, the characteristics that 
explain these differences can be used to better target 
food-safety messages. Furthermore, because some 
research has found a connection between vulner-
ability and fear (Killias and Clerici 2000) the results 
can also be used to gauge risk perceptions and pos-
sible affective response (Slovic 2002) should an 
agroterrorist event occur. Lastly, our research does 
not suggest a self-fulfilling prophecy between how 
consumers perceive vulnerability and any true vul-
nerability or any actual risk. Perception is not reality 
in this instance, and although one might well be 
tempted to link perceived vulnerability with actual 
vulnerability, we refrain from doing so and discour-
age readers from making any such attribution.
Food-System Vulnerability
This section provides an overview of the potential 
vulnerabilities across the agricultural and food-
supply chain. Before proceeding, it is important 
to distinguish among the various terminologies for 
fear, risk, and vulnerability, all of which are key 
ingredients to analyzing problems of risk. Fear is an 
emotional response of agitation and anxiety caused 
by the presence or imminence of danger; risk refers 
to the possibility of suffering harm or loss or some 
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ceptibility of an individual, market, or economy to 
physical, emotional, or economic injury. Because 
of this susceptibility, vulnerability encompasses a 
sense of likelihood. This likelihood establishes the 
risk of harm, and it is the risk of harm based on ob-
jective measures of probability, or the perceived risk 
of harm based on subjective probabilities, that gives 
rise to the affective response of fear. Although such 
distinctions can be made between vulnerability, risk, 
and fear this does not ease the task of terrorist-risk 
assessment (as labeled by Garrick 2002) for the 
two required inputs—fear, which guides behavior, 
and vulnerability/risk, which guide fear—are in-
extricably linked. In fact, Webster’s Encyclopedic 
Unabridged Dictionary definition for terror is “an 
intense fear that is somewhat prolonged and refers 
to imagined or future dangers” (cf. Becker and Ru-
binstein 2004), so an act of terrorism in this sense 
creates fear. Economics is generally not well suited 
for such an abstraction, yet it is quite evident that 
to create fear without purpose is a costly proposi-
tion for any terrorist. Turvey et al. (2003) use the 
concept of consumer hysteresis and discuss how 
fear can lead to a shift in demand and a fear-in-
duced decrease in its elasticity. By recognizing this 
behavior a terrorist can create real negative welfare 
effects. Similarly, Becker and Rubinstein (2004) 
base their economics on a rational-choice model in 
which marginal utility remains constant over risky 
states while fear changes the marginal utility in 
each state. In other words, “fear depreciates utility 
from consumption,” and by generating fear, even in 
low-probability events, the economic impacts may 
not be inconsequential. Furthermore, research by 
Killias and Clerici (2000) shows a very close link 
between vulnerability and fear (of crime). 
In reality, the actual risks of an agroterrorist 
attack are quite minute. Globally, there have only 
been 21 recorded incidences of attacks on either 
the agricultural or food system since 1952 (Owens 
2002; Cameron and Pate 2001). Still, the threat of 
terrorism on the food supply is real, and because 
of the huge economic, health, and social-welfare 
costs associated with food contamination, the food 
supply presents a tempting target for terrorists who 
want to destabilize the American economy (USFDA 
2003; Turvey et al. 2003; Sandler and Enders 2002; 
Owens 2002; Foxell 2001; Cameron and Pate 2001; 
Wheelis 2000). Contamination of food may have 
enormous economic implications in the U.S., where 
one out of every eight Americans is employed in 
an occupation directly linked to food production 
(Chalk 2001). The costs to individual food compa-
nies and to entire agricultural sectors of failing to 
prevent food contamination can be enormous. These 
costs can include those associated with a physical 
recall of contaminated product. In 2000, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture estimated that foodborne 
illnesses linked to five pathogens cost the economy 
$6.9 billion annually (Crutchfield and Roberts 
2000). For example, Khan, Swerdlow, and Juranek 
(2001) report that the costs to a U.S. company of the 
1998 recall of 30 million pounds of frankfurters and 
luncheon meats possibly contaminated by Listeria 
were between $50 and $70 million and ultimately 
caused the processing facility to be closed. The 
costs of failing to prevent food contamination can 
also mount as the result of damage to perceived 
reputation and quality, the costs of product liability 
litigation (Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco 2001; Lenain, 
Bonturi, and Koen 2002), the loss of market value 
of company stock (Salin and Hooker 2001; Wang 
et al. 2002) and the loss of export markets (Nitsch 
and Schumacher 2002). Indeed, after the discovery 
of a single cow infected with Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalitis (BSE) in December of 2003 the beef 
industry saw a plunge in the value of older cattle, 
widespread layoffs, beef stranded on ships in for-
eign ports, and a 94-percent drop in beef exports, 
drastically reducing profits for many American beef 
processors (Scott 2004). 
Recognizing food-system vulnerabilities, indus-
try and government have made large legislative, 
regulatory, and research investments designed to 
identify, reduce, and eliminate threats posed at key 
points in the supply chain (Sheffi 2001; Ollinger 
and Ballenger 2003). These include modifications 
to the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points 
System (HACCP) (USDA-FSIS 1996; Nganje 
and Mazzacco 2000), improved quality-control 
measures throughout the food-supply chain (Antle 
2000) and traceability of food through a proposal 
to mandate Country of Origin Labeling (CoOL), 
additional FDA regulations implementing the 
2002 Bioterrorism Act, and the USDA’s National 
Animal Identification System. Some have argued 
for increased shipment visibility through radio 
frequency identification device (RFID) tracking 
(Collins 2003) and greater collaboration along the 
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ance on public/private partnerships in information 
sharing and security (Sheffi 2001). While consensus 
is lacking on the degree to which the food system is 
vulnerable to a deliberate attack aimed at destabi-
lizing the economy and disrupting the flow of food 
(e.g. Cameron and Pate 2001; Foxell 2002), it is 
beyond debate that the opportunity exists (WHO 
2002). 
Risk Perceptions and Vulnerability
We focus on understanding the perceived vulner-
abilities that give rise to consumers’ fear. Vulner-
ability is related to the perceived likelihood of an 
event occurring. Our aim here is to treat vulner-
ability as a bundle of attributes and perceptions. In 
the next sections we describe results from a national 
telephone survey with questions specifically geared 
towards measuring how consumers perceive risk 
and vulnerability. We then describe these effects 
using an econometric consumer-choice model.
A survey instrument was developed to collect 
information on consumer attitudes and risk per-
ceptions toward agroterrorism. Specifically, each 
respondent was asked to rate the vulnerability of 
food or points of the food chain to a terrorist attack. 
The foods covered included fresh, processed, and 
canned; the five segments of the food chain contin-
uum are farms, processing plants, food warehouses, 
food transport, and grocery stores). Contamination 
of foodstuffs can occur at any point during the food-
production process, from the importation of seeds to 
the unpacking of finished products at a supermarket. 
Along the way, even relatively unprocessed food 
passes through warehouses and packaging/labeling 
facilities and is transported several times on vehicles 
that are not always secure (Greco 2002). A section 
of the survey was devoted to gathering information 
on the socio-economic and value characteristics of 
the respondents, including age, gender, ethnicity, 
education, income, family size, employment status, 
religious practice, and political views. Also col-
lected was respondents’ knowledge of information 
pertaining to the food-chain continuum, (starting 
from food production at the farm, manufacturing, 
processing, transportation to the food outlets and 
groceries), food safety, and respondents’ confidence 
in the groceries and federal government to ensure 
safety of foods eaten in case of a contamination. 
Data from non-institutionalized American adults 
were gathered from October 2004 to November 
2004, using telephone interviews. The interviews 
were completed using computer assisted-telephone 
interview technology (CATI). Adult respondents 
were selected from the 50 states using random-
digit dialing, and proportionally selecting for 
gender. U.S. Census Bureau population estimates 
were used to verify the approximate distribution for 
proportionate national coverage. A total of 1,010 
interviews were completed (sampling error ±3.1%), 
and the interviews took approximately 22.6 minutes 
to complete. Responses to some of the questions 
in the survey were not usable for the analysis, thus 
excluding some respondents from the sample during 
empirical analysis. As a result of excluding these 
respondents, a total of 762 completed surveys were 
used for empirical analysis. 
We measure two classes of vulnerability based 
on type of food and segment in the supply chain. 
By vulnerability we mean the likelihood of expo-
sure to harm. Although we use the term “current” 
in the questions, no time frame was placed on the 
risk, but it was assumed that the perceptions were 
related to the present or near future rather than some 
distant event. The first class of vulnerability dealt 
with the nature of the food item, while the second 
dealt with vulnerability across the food-distribution 
network and supply chain. The food items included 
as choices were meat, fruits and vegetables, fresh 
foods, dairy products, grains, beverages, processed 
foods, prepared foods, canned foods, and frozen 
foods.1 Segments of the food chain and food-dis-
tribution channel considered included processing 
plants, food transport, food warehouses, grocery 
stores, and farm.2 Both questions were rated on a 
100-point scale. Using responses to these questions, 
the dependent variable was discretized into four 
categorical groups based on the quartiles of the 
1 The exact question asked for specific foods was “Now I would 
like to talk to you about the current vulnerability of some types 
of food to a terrorist contamination. Please tell me on a scale 
of 1 to 100, 0 being Not at all likely and 100 being Absolutely 
likely, how likely you think each of the following is to be a 
target for terrorist contamination.”
2 The exact question asked for point of the food chain was “I 
would like to talk to you about the current vulnerability of some 
specific parts of the food-supply chain in the U.S. Please tell me 
on a scale of 1 to 100, 0 being Not at all likely and 100 being 
Absolutely likely, how likely you think each of the following 
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100-point scale. We then collapsed the third and 
fourth quartile into one category after testing for 
heterogeneity in the groups. The Mann-Whitney 
non-parametric test was applied; the test reveals that 
collapsing the third and fourth categories causes no 
loss of information in the dependent variable relat-
ing to the vulnerability of the food or a point in the 
food chain (Mann and Whitney 1947). 
The resulting three discretized values were ap-
plied to an ordered multinomial PROBIT model 
using the approach described in Greene (2002). The 
dependent variables were deﬁ  ned as follows: Yi = 
0 if the response was “not at all vulnerable” (i.e., 
rated between 0 and 25), Y = 1 if the response was 
“somewhat vulnerable” (rated between 26 and 55), 
and Y = 2 if the response was “most vulnerable” 
(rated between 56 and 100). These breaks were 
validated using the Mann-Whitney test. A total of 
15 separate regressions were run, one for each of 
ten different food types and ﬁ  ve different segments 
along the supply chain. The rationale behind sepa-
rate models is that, from a theoretical point of view, 
consumer perceptions need not be homogenous. 
Consumers from different backgrounds (demo-
graphic, economic, etc.) may perceive the various 
risks differently. Let Zi be an index of consumer 
i’s perceived vulnerability of the food/point of the 
food chain. People with different economic and de-
mographic attributes such as income or education 
and other attributes such as religiosity or political 
afﬁ  liation may rate certain segments of the food 
system or foods to be more or less vulnerable than 
may others. Using responses to these questions, the 
dependent variable Y of an ordered multinomial 
PROBIT model Y = f(Z) – g(x1, x2...) where f(  ) is 
a nonlinear function of an estimated index Z, which 
in turn is a function of the independent variables xij. 
The attributes used in the analyses are deﬁ  ned in 
detail below. Accordingly, Zi is modeled as a func-
tion of the ith consumer’s economic, demographic, 
and value attributes as follows: 
(1)
  Zx x ii i i = ′ += + + + β X νββ β 01 12 2
           … … ++ βν ki k i x ,  i = 1, 2,  , n   ,
where xij denotes the jth attribute of the ith respon-
dent, β = (β0, β1, …,βk) is the parameter vector to be 
estimated and ν is the error disturbance term (see 
Greene 2002 for details). 
 The model explanatory variables capture the 
potential inﬂ  uence of economic, demographic, and 
value attributes of the respondents on perceived vul-
nerability. The variables listed in Table 1 can be 
described in broad categories of sex, age, education, 
income, politics and religiosity, knowledge of the 
food system, trust, and regionalism. Sex is used to 
distinguish whether males or females have differ-
ing views on vulnerability. For example, the idea 
of the “security mom” might indicate that females 
are more sensitive to vulnerability than are males.3 
The age variables represent possible differences 
in attitudes toward degrees of vulnerability due to 
life experiences. We use education as a knowledge 
metric; individuals with more education may be 
more aware and knowledgeable of issues of food 
safety and vulnerability across the food chain. 
Income is used as a metric of wealth. Income can 
reﬂ  ect many attributes, including education, but 
could also indicate a broader knowledge base and 
awareness of current events, leading to differences 
in opinions and attitudes about risk. Religiosity 
was included as a metric to determine whether 
faith inﬂ  uences beliefs and attitudes. This may 
lead to different beliefs about the risks from those 
of lesser faith. Political sensitivities are important 
in terms of beliefs about threats. For example, a 
clear divide is evident between republicans and 
democrats regarding the Iraq war. This divisive-
ness may translate into attitudes about vulnerability. 
The knowledge-base items about food safety and 
the food chain might indicate different degrees of 
perceived vulnerability. For example, identifying 
trust through a conﬁ  dence indicator in the ability 
of government and groceries to protect the food 
supply against intentional contamination might 
reﬂ  ect different degrees of vulnerability. If there 
is substantial trust, then vulnerability and risk may 
be perceived to be low. Finally, regional differences 
may arise for a number of reasons. For example the 
concentration of centers of commerce and trade, 
versus concentrations of agriculture and agribusi-
ness, may represent different value systems. Risk 
perceptions may also be inﬂ  uenced on an east-west 
basis because the eastern states, due to the events 
of 9/11, might be viewed as being more vulnerable. 
Also, there may be disparity by regions because of 
3 This study does not distinguish between mothers and females; 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Description of variable Mean Std. dev
MALE 1 = respondent is male; 0 = female 0.46 0.50
YOUNG 1= age less than 25 years; 0 = otherwise 0.10 0.29
MIDAGE 1 = age is between 25 and 54 years; 0 = otherwise 0.62 0.49
MATAGE 1 = age 55 and 64 years; 0 = otherwise 0.15 0.35
SENAGE* 1 = age 65 or higher; 0 = otherwise 0.14 0.34
BELOWHSC 1 = Below High school education; 0 = otherwise 0.34 0.48
TWO_4YRC 1 = some two year college education to four-year college 
education; 0 otherwise
0.52 0.50
GRAD* 1 = graduate education; 0 = otherwise 0.14 0.35
L O W _
MIDINC(INCLT35)
1 = (annual) income below $35,000; 0 = otherwise 0.33 0.47
MID_INC(INC35-50) 1 = (annual) income between $35,000 and $50,000;
0 = otherwise
0.17 0.37
MID_HIINC(INC50-75) 1 = (annual) income between $50,000 and $75,000;
0 = otherwise
0.22 0.42
HIGHINC(INCAB75)* 1 = (annual) income greater than $75,000; 0 = other-
wise
0.29 0.45
RELIG 1 = attends church (or other house of worship) at least 
once a week, several times a month or once a month; 0 
= otherwise
0.60 0.49
WHITE 1 = respondent is white (Caucasian); 0 otherwise
Can different perceptions of risk be attributed to ethnic-
ity. 
0.83 0.38
LIBERAL 1 = identifies himself/herself as liberal; 0 = otherwise 0.18 0.38
CONSERV 1 = identifies himself/herself as conservative; 0 = oth-
erwise 
0.31 0.46
CENTRIST* 1 = identifies him/herself in between; 0 = otherwise 0.51 0.50
HI_KNFCN* 1 = has great deal of knowledge about the food supply 
chain; 0 otherwise
0.08 0.27




LOW_ KNFCN 1 = has low knowledge about the food supply chain;
0 otherwise
0.31 0.46
HI_KNFSFT* 1 = has great deal of knowledge about the food safety;
0 otherwise
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Variable Description of variable Mean Std. dev
MED_ KNFSFT 1 = has average knowledge about the food safety;
0 otherwise
0.59 0.49
LOW_ KNFSFT 1 = has low knowledge about the food safety; 0 other-
wise
0.34 0.47
FSAF_GRC 1 = holds view that food in the grocery store is safe;
0 = otherwise
0.56 0.50
DBSAF_GRC 1 = holds view that food in the grocery store is unsafe 
due to deliberate tampering; 0 = otherwise
0.82 0.38
ACFSAF_GRC 1 = holds view that food in the grocery store is unsafe 
due to accidental errors; 0 = otherwise
0.63 0.48
SKEP_GROCAB 1 = holds skeptic view about Grocery ability to ensure 
food safety; 0 = otherwise
0.15 0.35
SKEP_GOVAB 1 = holds skeptic view about Government ability to 
ensure food safety; 0 = otherwise
0.21 0.41
MIDWEST 1 = respondent resides in Midwest; 0 = otherwise 0.25 0.43
SOUTH 1 = respondent resides in southern U.S.; 0 = otherwise 0.36 0.48
NOR_EAST* 1 = respondent resides in Northeastern U.S.; 0 = other-
wise
0.18 0.39
WEST 1 = respondent resides in western states.; 0 = otherwise 0.20 0.40
* Implies that the variable was dropped during estimation to avoid dummy variable trap.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. (Continued)Journal of Food Distribution Research 38(3) 76   November 2007 Consumers’ Perception of Food-System Vulnerability to an Agroterrorist Attack   77 Turvey et al.
political power—for example the “red states” ver-
sus “blue states” for those regions predominantly 
republican versus democratic.
Table 1 presents the specific definitions of the 
independent variables used in the empirical model. 
Using the variable definitions, the following em-
pirical model is specified to model perceived vul-
nerability of a food or point of the food chain (Zi) 
and consumer economic, demographic, and value 
attributes:
(2)
 (Zi) = β0 + β1MALE + β2MED_KNFC + β3LOW_
KNFC + β4MED+KNFS + β5LOW_KNFS 
+  β6FSAF_GRC  +  β7DBSAF_GRC 
+  β8FACC_GRC  +  β9CFDGRCA  + 
β10CFDGOVA + β11YOUNG + β12MIDAGE 
+ β13MATAGE + β14BELOWHS + β15TWO_
4YRC + β16RELIG + β17LIBERAL + 
β18CONSERV + β19WHITE + β20INCLT35 
+ β21INCLT35+50 + β22INCLT50_75 + 
β23MIDWEST + β24SOUTH + β25WEST 
+ ε. 
An ordered multinomial PROBIT model was 
estimated for each of the ten foods and five points 
in the food chain using maximum-likelihood (ML) 
estimation. The model summary statistics, β-coef-
ficients (along with their t-ratios), and the marginal 
effects, evaluated at the means, were obtained by 
using the software package LIMDEP (Econometric 
Software 2002). 
Empirical Results
The descriptive statistics show that we can rank 
perception into three categories: most vulnerable, 
medium vulnerability, and least vulnerable. In the 
case of food products, it was found that meat, fruits 
and vegetables, and fresh food products were (per-
ceived to be) the most vulnerable. The foods that 
consumers believed less likely to be attacked were 
prepared foods, canned foods, and frozen foods. 
About 35 percent of the respondents felt that the 
meat products were most vulnerable to attack, with 
31 percent and 30 percent feeling that fresh foods 
and fruits and vegetables will be terrorist targets. 
Processing plants, food transport, and grocery 
stores were perceived to be the most vulnerable 
points in the food-supply chain. Processing plants 
ranked highest, with 33 percent of the respondents 
feeling that this segment of the supply chain was 
most vulnerable to attack; least vulnerable were 
the food warehouses, which only 12 percent of the 
respondents felt were vulnerable to attack.
In terms of the econometric analysis, we focus 
on reporting the marginal effects (evaluated at the 
means) of the most vulnerable food/point of the 
food chain to be attacked (i.e., the marginal effects 
of the probability of being “most vulnerable” to a 
terrorist attack [Y = 2] and for the statistically sig-
nificant variables only). To analyze the results, we 
first establish model performance via measures of 
goodness of fit. In this respect, results suggest that 
the response categories coded 0, 1, and 2 are indeed 
ordered as justified previously by the Mann-Whit-
ney test. Additionally, the chi-square statistic test for 
the overall significance of the independent variables 
is used to reject the null in all the 15 models, sug-
gesting that the regressors chosen were relevant in 
explaining the likelihood of a terrorist attack. Sec-
ondly, individual coefficients were subjected to the 
t-test for significance. However, coefficients from 
ordered multinomial PROBIT models are difficult to 
interpret, and one has to be cautious in using them 
to make inferences (Greene 2002). We therefore use 
the calculated marginal effects to make inferences 
on how changes in regressors affect the perceived 
probabilities of particular events. 
Explaining Perceptions of Vulnerability 
The independent variables—race, religion, and 
views about the ability of the federal government 
to ensure food safety after a contamination—were 
insignificant predictors across all the models and 
therefore are not reported. The parameter estimates 
and the associated t-ratios of the models are reported 
in Tables 2–5. Tables 2 and 3 provide ordered mul-
tinomial PROBIT estimates for the seven food and 
beverage categories, while Table 4 presents results 
for points along the food chain. The first set of col-
umns in Tables 2–5 present the ordered multinomial 
PROBIT parameter estimates, while the second set 
of columns present the marginal effects. The mar-
ginal effects of an independent variable for given 
change are calculated at their sample means while 
holding other independent variables constant.
The results show that education, income, and 
age had the most influence in the consumer’s per-
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estimates, foods and points of the food chain were 
ranked in terms of intensity of consumer perceptions 
about vulnerability. For example, using age to rank 
vulnerability, young people felt that meats, fresh 
foods, and fresh fruits and vegetables were most 
vulnerable, while processing plants, food transport, 
and groceries were ranked as the most likely targets 
of a terrorist attack. These observations are sum-
marized below.
Gender: Compared to females, males were four 
to ten percent less likely to consider occurrence of 
terrorist acts on meats, fresh foods, and fruits and 
vegetables and on processing plants, food transport 
and grocery stores. 
Age: Compared to those over 65 years, young 
people (<25 years) were 13 to 27 percent more like-
ly to consider the meats, fruits and vegetables, and 
fresh foods as more vulnerable along with the pro-
cessing plants, food transport, and grocery stores. 
Four categorical variables were defined for age to 
measure relative groupings of young, middle-aged, 
and aged. While actual age data was collected for 
respondents, some respondents preferred to provide 
age according to categories.
Income: Low-income respondents (those earn-
ing less than $35,000) considered meat and grocery 
stores to be equally as vulnerable as did those in 
the high-income category (over $75,000). Low-
income respondents placed fruits and vegetables, 
fresh foods, and food transport in the second tier; 
those in this income group were about ten more 
likely to consider fruits and vegetables and fresh 
foods vulnerable and about six percent more likely 
to consider food transport vulnerable. Income was 
collected as a categorical rather than a continuous 
variable.
Education: Those with a high school education 
or less were four to 12 percent more likely to con-
sider the meats, fruits, and vegetables, processing 
plants, and food transport to be more vulnerable 
to terrorist attacks than were those with graduate 
degrees. 
Political Leanings: Political leaning was iden-
tified by asking respondents if they were liberal, 
centrist, or conservative. We refrained from asking 
any questions about actual party affiliation because 
one could be conservative and vote Democratic or 
liberal and vote Republican. Conservatives were 
five to seven percent less likely to consider meats, 
fresh foods, and fruits and vegetables to be the more 
likely targets of attack compared to the centrists.
Knowledge about the Food-Supply Chain and 
Food Safety: Those with medium knowledge about 
the food-supply chain were 12 percent more likely 
to consider fresh foods to be the most likely target 
of a terrorist attack compared to those with excel-
lent knowledge. Those with low knowledge of food 
safety were five to 11 percent more likely to view 
processing plants, food transport, and grocery stores 
as the most vulnerable to a terrorist attack compared 
with those with excellent knowledge. 
Grocery Store Safety: Those who considered 
grocery stores to be extremely safe compared to 
those who did not were six percent more likely to 
consider fruits and vegetables to be a most likely 
target of terrorism, and were five to 11 percent 
more likely to consider processing plants, food 
transport, and grocery stores to be most vulnerable 
to attacks. 
Deliberate Food Tampering and Accidental 
Food Tampering: Those who felt that food in the 
grocery stores was unsafe due to deliberate tamper-
ing or accidental errors were five to 17 percent more 
likely to consider meats, fresh food, and fruits and 
vegetables to be more likely targets of a terrorist 
attack. Similarly, they were six to nine percent more 
likely to feel the same about processing plants, food 
transport, and grocery stores. 
Confidence in Grocery Stores and the Federal 
Government to Ensure Food Safety: Those who 
were skeptical about grocery stores having an ability 
to ensure food safety in the case of contamination 
were four to 16 percent more likely to believe that 
meats, fruits and vegetables, and fresh foods were 
the most likely targets of terrorist attacks. They 
were also about seven percent more likely than 
those with confidence in grocery stores to think 
that food transport was most likely to be attacked. 
Having confidence in the federal government to 
ensure food safety in the case of contamination 
was not found to be significant.
Region: People from the West were six to ten 
percent less likely to consider meats, fruits and 
vegetables, and fresh foods to be the most likely 
targets of terrorist attacks than were those from 
the Northeast.Journal of Food Distribution Research 38(3) 78   November 2007 Consumers’ Perception of Food-System Vulnerability to an Agroterrorist Attack   79 Turvey et al.











































































































































































(1.57) -0.10 -0.06 -0.07
* denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level.
** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.10 level.
Table 2. Estimated Model Coefficients, t-ratios, and Marginal Effects for Meat, Fruit and Vegetables, 
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-0.04 -0.05 0.01 -0.07
* denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level. 
** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.10 level.
Table 3. Estimated Model Coefficients, t-ratios, and Marginal Effects for Dairy, Grain, Beverages, 
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Table 4. Food Chain Points: Estimated Model Coefficients, t-ratios, and Marginal Effects for Process-










































































































































































































* denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level. 
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Conclusion
The results across various food types and links in 
the food chain indicate with reasonable statistical 
comfort that socio-economic attributes have a role 
to play in identifying perceived vulnerabilities, 
with age having a higher influential effect. Using 
the marginal effects estimates across the foods and 
points of the food chain, we ranked the foods and 
food chain in order of likelihood of a terrorist attack. 
The results show that young people, those with low 
incomes (<$35,000), those with less than medium 
knowledge about the food chain and food safety, 
those skeptical about grocery store safety abilities, 
and those with low education (high school and be-
low) were likely to feel that meats, fresh foods, and 
fruits and vegetables are more vulnerable to terror-
ist attacks than are other food items. People fitting 
this profile similarly viewed processing plants, food 
transport, and grocery stores to be more vulnerable 
to terrorist attacks than are the farm-level produc-
tion and food warehouses. In view of these findings, 
education and outreach efforts are critical to inform-
ing the public about agroterrorism and food-system 
security. This analysis contributes to a better under-
standing of public perceptions about agroterrorism 
and how prone consumers believe the food system is 
to agroterrorism. However, what consumers believe 
may constitute a vulnerability says little about how 
such perceptions interact with economic decisions 
and markets or how consumers will respond to an 
actual attack. Indeed, readers should not interpret 
the results of this study as a response to terrorist risk. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that perceptions have 
any a priori impact on markets, but they may have 
significant consequences should an event actually 
happen. In other words, latent individual percep-
tions may well be amplified or exacerbated by an 
actual event, with the different groups responding 
in different ways. There is some evidence to support 
this. Becker and Rubinstein (2003), for example, 
find that high-frequency air travelers did not change 
their behavior after the 9/11 terrorist attacks rela-
tive to low-frequency travelers; that high-frequency 
visitors to coffee houses in Israel did not change 
consumption patterns following suicide attacks 
relative to low-frequency users; and, citing Adda 
(2000), note that the decrease in beef consumption 
following the discovery of Mad Cow Disease in 
France in 1996 was by low-frequency beef consum-
ers, not high-frequency beef consumers. Academic 
research investigating agroterrorism and fear is in its 
infancy. Research needs to continue in identifying 
critical parameters of economic models, and testing 
them experimentally with consumers. 
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